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The recent concentration of attention by some political scientists on evaluating the 
effectiveness of democracy assistance, drawing on the transient policy concerns of 
major donors, is a welcome innovation to a research agenda traditionally biased 
towards aid’s significance for economic development. But its focus is restricted and 
unrepresentative.  This paper argues the case for a more comprehensive assessment 
of the domestic political consequences – both direct and indirect – of all forms of aid, 
in principle for aid recipients everywhere. This recommendation offers the advantage 
of serving the limited purposes of analysts of democratization generally and 
democracy aid specifically, but more importantly reconnects their approach with the 
broader political analysis of aid by a wider social science community. It is important 
to ‘think outside the box’ of contemporary donor concerns, recalibrating the research 
agenda in ways that raise other political priorities. The article offers a framework for 
this purpose. Comprehending the political dynamics in aid-receiving countries should 
be the primary orienting principle, rather than viewing countries as objects of aid and 
proceeding to interpret their politics through the distorting lens of donor perspectives. 
 




This article argues the case for examining as comprehensively as is practical the 
domestic political effects of aid in the aid-receiving countries. By aid is meant the 
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usual Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) understanding of resources transferred on 
a concessionary basis for developmental purposes – economic, social or political. The 
argument proceeds by first reporting an agenda of research that has come to capture 
the close interest of a notable body of political scientists and aid practitioner 
organisations. It engages with that agenda in order to recommend moving beyond it, 
reconnecting with the primary interests of the study of politics as a whole, and politics 
in aid-receiving countries specifically. Of course ideas of politics are social and 
cultural constructs; what is perceived to be politically significant in one society might 
not resonate equally strongly elsewhere. So, studies of aid’s political effects in any 
country must draw on that society’s own understanding of politics. That said, politics 
is presumed to be about who gets what, when, where and how. Everywhere the 
distribution, use and misuse of power are central features. They cannot be examined 
wholly through a lens framed by the issues of democracy and democracy- promotion - 
a moral that is not lost on the larger community of social scientists studying political 
aspects of development more generally and those members already researching wide-
ranging aspects of aid politics more specifically. 
 
Until recently a great deal of research on the effects of foreign aid focused on 
its economic consequences, and hence Goldsmith’s [2001: 128] observation ‘More 
work clearly needs to be done to ascertain the extent to which aid has a destructive 
effect on the state’. Yet the fact is that recently there has been a surge of studies into 
into democracy aid, its achievements and the difficulties of evaluation (for example 
Blair, 2003; Burnell, 2000; Carothers, 1999; Craword, 2001; Crawford, 2003a; 
Crawford, 2003b), situated within a context of heightened interest in international 
democracy promotion more generally (Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi, 2000; Olsen, 
2000; Santiso, 2003; Schraeder, 2002; and Youngs, 2001). In September 2003, the 
General Conference of the European Consortium of Political Research, held at the 
University of Marburg, saw an entire new cluster of research presentations on 
European Union aid and democracy support in particular. The idea of democracy aid 
or assistance is now firmly embedded in the literature. It stretches as far as aid for 
human rights causes and, even, aspects of ‘good governance’. None of the 
aforementioned inquiries presume that democracy aid has been successful. On the 
contrary they challenge the tendency of democracy promotion agencies to talk up 
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their own achievements. They question the presumption that good intentions will 
ensure successful outcomes – outcomes measured by yardsticks of the agencies’ 
choosing. And some of the analysts share with a few of the aid agencies a 
commitment to overcome the difficulties surrounding how to measure democracy 
aid’s performance. Nevertheless, the focus in all cases is limited, in two important 
respects. And for that reason it is argued here that it would be unfortunate if such 
research continued to proceed in a manner disconnected from other studies into aid’s 
political effects (for example Moore and Putzel,1999 or Bräutigam, 2000), or if it 
captured a disproportionate share of new attention.  
 
Limitations 
First, other forms of aid than democracy aid can have consequences – positive and 
negative - for democracy. The consequences might reinforce democracy aid’s impact 
on democratization, or, on the contrary nullify, or perhaps even outweigh its effects, 
especially where democracy aid’s effects appear to be neutral or non-existent. In one 
of the most often vented illustrations of this problematic, the economic and social 
policy conditionalities that are routinely attached to economic aid threaten to empty 
out the significance of domestic political processes, by constraining the recipient 
government’s scope for making choices. Responsibility for economic policy-making 
is externalised. The point is not simply that this hinders domestic ‘ownership’ of 
decisions but that it may prevent politicians (who may have been democratically 
elected) showing responsiveness to society’s felt needs and expressed wishes. That 
cannot be good for representative democracy – a system that presupposes 
accountability to the people.  
 
As a general rule, then, the consequences of aid in its entirety should be 
factored into the equation even by analysts whose interest is confined to just the 
democracy consequences of aid. This suggests a larger frame of reference than that 
used by most practitioners of democracy aid when they try to measure how successful 
their interventions have been. But clearly a larger frame is vital if we are interested in 
enhancing the democratic prospect, even just western-style liberal democracy rather 
than some more participatory, radical ideal. Indeed, looking at all aid weakens one of 
the objections that is sometimes put up against subjecting democracy aid to 
exhaustive impact evaluations, namely that it is too insignificant for its wider impact 
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to be noticeable [Crawford, 2003b]. At the very least, democracy promotion agencies 
should be interested in the domestic political consequences of other kinds of aid, in as 
much as they influence the opportunities, constraints and receptivity to democracy aid 
- and thereby that aid’s likely effectiveness. Where, in contrast, our interest in 
democracy aid’s effectiveness stems primarily not from an interest in democracy 
promotion but in democratization – in the meaning of democracy and how democratic 
change is propelled and by what forces - then concentration on just the democracy 
consequences of democracy aid is obviously insufficient. 
 
 Secondly, democracy aid and, indeed, other kinds of aid too can have larger 
political consequences for the recipient country than democratic consequences. These 
wider consequences may be much more significant than the democracy effects, as 
well as having implications indirectly for the condition of democracy more 
specifically. Furthermore as Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón [1999] remind us, 
democracy’s value is limited anyway: it fits uneasily with certain other values, 
including, possibly, important elements of economic development, and in many 
respects is unequal to the demands it confronts. And if the goal is to understand the 
domestic politics of countries that simply happen to receive aid – as this paper 
recommends - then just as domestic political structures influence their foreign policy 
behaviour, so domestic politics is influenced – explained - by the international or 
external relations including aid [Gourevitch, 1978]. 
 
Historically aid has taken different forms, shapes and sizes geared to a variety 
of aims and objectives. Some aid flows are too complex to be easily pigeon-holed into 
a simple category like economic aid or political aid, and in any case the problem of 
fungibility means that aid for one purpose can end up supporting something 
completely different. There is political aid that is not democracy aid, and security 
assistance more broadly defined, apart from the considerable resources devoted to 
military assistance especially during the cold war. Security-related assistance has 
sometimes been transferred under the guise of economic support, which challenges 
the DAC definition of development aid. There is support for economic development 
narrowly defined, aid to social development and for human development, and disaster 
relief or emergency aid, sometimes followed by help with rehabilitation and 
reconstruction. The recent exponential growth in theorising about international 
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humanitarian intervention draws attention to aid for conflict-prevention and conflict-
resolution, for post-conflict-reconstruction and state-(re)building. Large-scale 
international financial transfers have also been made in response to a financial crisis 
or collapse of the currency. And then there are various kinds of technical assistance or 
advice that increasingly intrude into almost any and every facet of economic, social 
and political life, from macro-level processes like national planning to micro-level 
involvement in detailed policy execution, for example the delivery of health care. 
These can all have significant political effects, even without the aid-providers 
declaring or acknowledging explicit political objectives. The effects may or may not 
impinge on the democratic prospect. But they can be potentially more important in 
political terms than the democracy effectiveness, ineffectiveness or harmfulness to 
democracy of democracy aid. Development aid that purports to be about ‘empowering 
the poor’ is an obvious example especially given the politically contested 
understanding of that idea with donors [Moore, 2001]. All things considered, then, 
there are strong grounds for maintaining long-established traditions of subjecting 
development aid to political assessments that go well beyond the consequences for 
democracy.   
 
A possible retort is that because inquiries into democracy promotion tend to be 
drawn to investigate the democratic conditionalities that donors regularly attach to 
their development co-operation, their field of vision in practice extends to most 
examples of economic development aid. This ‘second generation’ of conditionalities, 
like the first generation (economic conditionalities) has received considerable 
attention (see Stokke, 1995, for example). There are even studies contrasting the 
effectiveness of different approaches to democracy conditionality - the threat of 
sanctions versus offers of incentives or inducements [Ethier, 2003] - and comparing 
these with concrete programmes like support for a stronger and more autonomous 
judiciary, closer parliamentary scrutiny of the executive, and robust civic associations. 
 
Yet the retort is unconvincing, for several reasons. For one, the democracy 
conditionalities ignore all of aid’s other political conditionalities - the ones not 
oriented towards promoting democracy, human rights and ‘good governance’ - as well 
as conditionalities that in the first instance have different objectives: economic; social; 
environmental and so on. Guaranteed special access to military facilities in a country 
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evokes an old-fashioned example of a form of non-democracy conditionality but one 
that is still not obsolete. Even economic conditionalities can have significant political 
effects, like allowing a government to deflect domestic political opposition to 
economic measures it might have taken (probably had to take) anyway. Similarly the 
external seal of approval that is conveyed by a package of conditional funding might 
help promote the authority of a new government, or help consolidate a recent change 
of regime. The institutional implications of economic conditionalities have indeed 
attracted some attention, for instance giving more power to finance ministries against 
spending departments. But it is in the context of explaining the failures of economic 
conditionalities by reason of ‘defections’ (in some cases voluntary and in others 
involuntary) that inquiries have come closest to raising questions about the domestic 
politics of such so-called ‘slippage’. Development economists among others have 
made notable contributions to this kind of work [Toye, 1992; Morrissey, 1999]. But 
the terms of reference framing their inquiries are those spelled out in the 
conditionalities: naturally their main concern is not with aid’s political consequences 
but with identifying the most favourable political environment for economic aid 
conditionalities and for the associated economic policies to work. 
 
A further objection to the retort, then, is that evaluations of the performance of 
democracy conditionalities are confined to the consequences relating to 
democratization, human rights, or ‘good governance’, rather than wider political 
consequences. A tendency for the democracy assistance to accentuate sharp divisions 
and accelerate fissiparous tendencies in society might go unrecorded. And in any case 
the mood among many economists now appears to be turning against attaching 
conditionalities for ‘good governance’ to development aid, following the World 
Bank’s report Assessing Aid (1998). That report argued for the abandonment of the 
conditionalities approach, in favour of targeting aid more selectively on countries 
already committed to ‘good governance’ and the like.1  It is said that ‘attempting to 
steer governance restructuring programmes from the outside have (sic) turned out to 
be far more complicated and laborious engagements than self-confident and optimistic 
aid agencies had first assumed they would be’ [Doornbos, 2001: 103]. Nevertheless it 
could still be argued that knowledge of aid’s wider political impact would remain 
useful for the purpose of identifying which countries are likely to (continue to) meet 
the selectivity criteria and so be eligible for future aid. And here the sum total of 
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conditionalities’ political effects, both intended and unintended may well be far more 
instructive than the democracy effects of democracy conditionalities. In theory 
democratization, human rights and good governance could be defined so inclusively 
that they amount to all of politics, and thereby rebut the point. But that would be 
contrary to customary usage.2  Moreover to do so would risk jeopardising much of 
what is most valuable about the recent researches into democracy aid’s effectiveness, 
such as its specificity and the practical definition of focus,3 while still end up 
conceding the general argument of this article. 
 
Finally, by suggesting that aid’s larger political impact continues to merit a 
greater concentration of attention than the more specialised matter of democracy aid 
in no way presumes that aid must always have considerable impact in practice. Where 
substantial aid flows to a country have no domestic political impact that can be just as 
revealing – both about aid and the country’s political, economic and social processes - 
as where aid reinforces the political status quo. In principle it would be no less 
intriguing than where democracy aid influences democratization without touching on 
other political variables. 
  
Learning from the Past 
Throughout much of the fifty plus years following the start of the Marshall Plan 
(European Recovery Programme) of 1947-51, the political effects of development aid 
have been a comparatively underdeveloped branch of inquiry.  Notwithstanding a 
limited number of exceptions from other disciplines, development economists have 
dominated the study of development aid; they continue to account for the great bulk 
of new research. The economic analysis of aid was pre-eminent precisely because it 
shaded into theorising about economic development and observation of actual 
economic outcomes - activities that attracted financial support from the aid agencies. 
In contrast, the charter or Articles of Agreement of the pre-eminent multilateral 
institutions forbade explicitly political objectives. Aid’s impact on politics was not 
their concern. United Nations agencies must respect the sovereignty of states and 
rights of non-intervention in internal affairs (UN Charter Article 2:7). The Bretton 
Woods institutions for many years took a cautious attitude towards considering the 
domestic political consequences of its lending decisions, although that has changed 
somewhat since the 1980s. Now issues to do with governance, military budgets and 
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certain kinds of human rights do figure in their deliberations, where they have 
undeniable significance for the development performance of Bank loans. But the 
interpretation of the ‘political’ dimensions of governance that these institutions can 
legitimately raise with borrowers is still restricted, except when acting as a co-
ordinating interlocutor on behalf of the donor governments. Anyway the broad thrust 
of much contemporary research both inside and outside these institutions revolves 
around aid’s consequences for economic, social and to a lesser extent human 
development, not its political effects. 
 
It was chiefly among American political scientists and foreign policy analysts 
that the political analysis of aid first developed. The concerns that recurred most often 
were the themes of particular interest to US foreign policy at the time: does US aid 
help stabilise anti-communist regimes?; does it purchase influence over the recipient 
governments’ voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly?; does US 
military assistance make military governments reliable allies in Latin America (a US 
sphere of influence closely monitored during the cold war)? The likelihood that the 
Kennedy administration’s Alliance for Progress (1962-3) would change society in 
Latin America (and dampen the appeal of Cuban-style communism) briefly attracted 
some attention, but the Alliance itself was soon abandoned.4 US aid’s failure to 
promote human rights in the region under successive administrations but especially 
the Carter presidency also was studied quite carefully (for example Carleton and 
Stohl, 1987). This reflected Congressional and liberal academic interest in this aspect 
of America’s manifest destiny, as much as curiosity about the internal affairs of 
America’s partners abroad. In the 1970s a few experts on public administration and 
organisation theory in public bureaucracies wrote about support for state-building in 
post-colonial societies. But even now it seems that the donor foreign policy rationales 
for aid and the lessons they should learn from experience continue to garner as much 
attention among political scientists as does aid’s consequences in recipient countries 
(see for example Schraeder, Hook and Taylor, 1998). 
 
In Europe, meanwhile, writers from the political left were more interested in 
showing how aid reduces third world states to dependent status, or convert their 
governments into ‘compradors’ whose behaviour could be explained largely in terms 
of external dependency. At its height in the 1970s this approach offered a ‘one size 
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fits all’ interpretation. It paid little heed to subtle variations in aid’s domestic political 
consequences and how the internal politics of partner countries mediated aid’s 
economic and political effects in ways distinctive to the country. Now the dependency 
approach is less prominent (but on aid imperialism see Petras and Veltmeyer, 2002), 
which is ironic, because many developing countries have seen their international 
bargaining position eroded by the end of the cold war and collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Moreover much contemporary aid and much aid analysis, democracy aid 
included, really does tend to treat the recipients as the dependent variable – they are 
object and not subject. Aid is done to them, courtesy of the donors, and aid’s 
allocation and design are geared to donor intentions. Nevertheless, in the official 
development discourse leftist perspectives have long since been overtaken by neo-
liberal thinking of the sort personified by Peter Bauer (1981), who reduced aid’s 
political impact to an equally simplistic set of claims: aid’s proclivity to politicise 
development policy and create ‘big’ government. The value of that perspective lies in 
publicising the fact that aid can alter the incentive structure relating to political power. 
But for aid’s critics from both the left and the right it was still what aid meant for the 
prospects of development understood in terms of economic progress and social 
welfare, not its political consequences that was the primary concern.  
 
Placed in historical context, then, the dramatic recent growth of interest in 
democracy aid’s effectiveness is a welcome addition to the research agenda. But it 
should not be allowed to overshadow the more enduring questions about aid’s 
political impact, which although not addressed entirely convincingly in the past 
continues to make a strong claim to be a more important focus of inquiry, for the 
following reasons.  
 
Rationale 
First, more systematic inquiry would help us decide which of the various competing 
big assertions from left and right has most validity and, more interestingly, under 
what conditions they hold most true. For example how extensive is aid’s influence on 
major public policy outputs, and does it really shape the leading political institutions 
and mould endogenous political cultures in the strikingly different ways that many 
critics allege? Or is it so marginal to the way power is used and distributed that the 
issue hardly merits much further inquiry? That last speculation clearly has not 
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discouraged attempts to evaluate democracy assistance: and if those attempts are at all 
worthwhile, then so much more so must be the investigation of aid in its entirety. 
 
More importantly - and a cause for concern - a focus on evaluating democracy 
assistance and its democracy consequences necessarily structures the inquiries in 
particular ways, which are both restrictive and likely to distort our understanding of 
aid’s multi-dimensional political effects. This remains true even where some thought 
is given to capturing the political context within which democracy aid programmes 
take place. Self-evidently such studies are oriented to the highly normative agenda of 
the policy-makers, namely their promotion of what their idea of democracy - which 
most closely resembles Robert Dahl’s (1971) concept of polyarchy, an elitist form of 
democracy - and the consequences for that democracy. This agenda has been designed 
to suit certain values and to serve specific interests. Arguably western donors value 
the spread of this democracy above all for its usefulness in promoting economic 
liberalism and furthering their own national economic and security-related goals. 
Whether or not it is the optimum solution to political problems in the aid-receiving 
countries may not be the primary concern. And as is equally well known the human 
rights agenda has been challenged for privileging certain political and civil rights over 
their social and economic counterparts, and for advancing notions that are 
incompatible with certain strongly held cultural and religious beliefs. The idea of 
‘good governance’ is manifestly a World Bank enthusiasm, which seems increasingly 
to circle around a narrow but shared obsession with reducing corruption. Yet as 
Hagopian [2000: 902] reminds us, ‘we must exercise strict caution not to assume that 
political development implies progress toward any particular set of goals’, that 
‘political society is lumpy, uneven, and, yes, contradictory’. He adds that it is to be 
expected that different parts of different political systems in different countries will 
‘develop’ at different rates and in different directions. 
 
Hence, research into aid’s domestic political effects should eschew 
identification with the contemporary prescriptive purposes of the aid policy-makers; it 
should get away from the ‘instrumentalization of prodemocracy policies’ that for 
instance Carothers [2003] claims is uppermost in the United States. The full range of 
domestic political consequences of aid tout court is not only a legitimate object of 
inquiry in its own right but potentially is of much greater significance to the aid 
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receiving countries than just the democracy effectiveness of democracy aid. And yet it 
should not be without interest to the donor organisations either. For attitudes are 
moving in favour of a right - sometimes expressed as the duty even – of the 
‘international community’ to intervene in domestic jurisdictions on behalf of citizens 
where their security is at risk – from their own government or from state failure. Thus 
although democracy promotion is not universally endorsed as sufficient justification 
for coercive ‘humanitarian intervention’ (see Pieterse, 1998), understanding how 
aid’s distribution can affect power relations among competing interests inside aid-
supported countries is ‘particularly crucial in understanding the dynamics of conflict 
and the current globalization of violence’ [Boyce, 2002a: 239].  Boyce [2002a: 239] 
argues that recognition of the connection between development and a country’s power 
structures and aid’s importance ‘in failing states, crumbling nations and societies in 
disarray’, is still rare in development discourse. The same point applies in some 
degree to the development aid discourse.5 Thus aid’s impact on the presence/absence 
of violent conflict within states, and on state fragility or effectiveness do demand 
attention, and not merely because of the consequences for the possibilities of 
meaningful democracy (and, hence, for the object of democracy promotion and for 
directing aid to that end). After all, the most aid-dependent states are chiefly in sub-
Saharan Africa, a region that contains several examples of ‘failed states’ and is unique 
in as much as the incidence of civil war did not decrease in the 1990s. Statistically, 
past experience of civil war increases the likelihood of similar conflicts in the future. 
Ergo, aid’s role there could be immense.  
 
Fashions both come and go, and so even the major donors could soon come to 
attach greater priority to political objectives other than either democracy or ‘good 
governance’ (if that shift is not under way already), as befits the forces driving their 
commitment to aid. Here, the evolution of the global security agenda post-‘September 
11’ and renewed interest in state-building/strengthening and nation-building in 
countries like Afghanistan comes to mind. The task of establishing the rule of law and 
orderly government in post-war Iraq is another example. The view that world poverty 
constitutes a major threat to international security and he belief that addressing socio-
economic deprivation offers the best antidote to international terrorism lends support 
to arguments for increased development co-operation. Part of the solution to poor 
development might be changing the government, but that does not mean giving 
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precedence to supporting the construction of a model of democracy - not in the short 
term, anyway.  
 
In fact clear signs are appearing of a return to much older ways of thinking 
about the relationship between democratic reform and development, downplaying the 
idea which became fashionable in the 1990s that democratization is functional for 
economic development. That idea powered support for democracy assistance among 
development aid communities. But generally speaking economists now reassert the 
more conventional view that the most efficacious way to tackle economic 
backwardness and poverty is to do so directly, namely through appropriate economic 
and social measures, supported where necessary by appropriate economic and social 
assistance. Certainly the United Nations Development Programme in its eye-catching  
Human Development Report 2002 (written largely by political consultants) gave 
considerable prominence to democratic governance as being central to human 
development, but it went on to confirm there is no strong evidential basis for 
attributing causal properties to democracy in respect of economic growth, let alone an 
automatic link to equitable social and economic development. So, not just the 
development aid industry’s interest in attaching political conditionalities but its 
willingness to indulge in democracy assistance could eventually start to fade. 
 
In any case, even at its peak democracy aid accounts for but a tiny fraction of 
all official development assistance – on most estimates the inclusion of ‘good 
governance’ aid does not raise the total beyond 5 per cent. What do we know about 
the effectiveness of democracy assistance? The answer is probably quite a lot, 
courtesy of the careful work of Crawford, Carothers, Blair and the like, and even 
more about the overall thrust of international attempts to promote democracy and so 
on, following recent work by Olsen, Stokke, Youngs and others. At the very least we 
now know better what the right questions are; we have learned which aspects need 
closer attention. This is an achievement. But of course the study of democracy aid 
mobilises bias in the political analysis of aid towards those very countries that the 
donors have targeted for democracy promotion. 
 
In contrast, what have we learned about the domestic political effects of 
development assistance to say China, or Egypt, or India, or Pakistan, or Israel, or 
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Turkey? These are important countries; and historically they are among the largest 
partners in official development co-operation, although not major recipients of 
democracy aid. In total they have accounted for a sizeable proportion of all official 
development assistance, and a substantial proportion of all military and security 
assistance too. The fact that their aid inflows are small in per capita terms and as a 
percentage of Gross National Product means they cannot be viewed as mere vassal 
states, or that dependency thinking will offer the most revealing insights. 
Development scholars continue to study linkages between aid and the consequences 
of social change for the distribution of power and donors’ attempts to refashion the 
instruments of governance, in some of these countries, but international relations 
experts seem more preoccupied with debating theoretical approaches to their 
discipline as a whole. Naturally their more policy-oriented inquiries among them and 
the field of diplomacy studies too are more interested in how aid relations contribute 
to international relations: the impact on relations between states or between states and 
international or transnational organisations, rather than the domestic politics. 
 
All Too Much? 
A possible objection to the argument that a larger and more wide-ranging 
investigation into aid’s domestic political impact is merited states that the agenda 
would be far too big and unmanageable. Certainly the agenda might be large but. But 
as is the case with most studies of aid analysts target their inquiries selectively, such 
as in respect of what kind of political effects to look for and which countries to dwell 
on. And even at its maximum the agenda is definitely not be all-embracing, so long as 
it prioritises the domestic political effects in recipient countries. That excludes aid’s 
impact on the external or international political relations of recipients - not just how it 
affects donor-recipient aid relations but the recipient state’s external orientation and 
behaviour towards other states. That is not to deny those consequences could be 
momentous and worthy of investigation in their own right, as well as possibly having 
significant ‘knock-on’ effects for domestic politics.  
 
Further additional lines of inquiry that also can be separated out rather easily 
refer to how the internal politics of donor countries impacts on their aid policies, for 
instance the lobbying by voluntary development agencies, and the consequences of 
aid for the donor countries’ internal politics. The last is another subject that for the 
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most part is under-researched, for instance the recycling of profits earned through 
(tied) aid-assisted projects back into political party funding and election campaigns. 
The distinction between internal and external relations is of course just an analytical 
convenience that is increasingly questioned in today’s globalising world of porous 
national borders and growing significance to supraterritorial and supranational forces. 
The increasingly problematic nature of the domestic/international dichotomy cannot 
be emphasised too strongly. On the one hand, externally-determined aid 
conditionalities constrain political choices on economic, welfare and other matters 
inside the partner country. Indeed, in the most aid dependent and easily penetrated 
polities the donor community may be almost embedded in the countries’ machinery of 
government. For example donors may determine key placements in strategic 
institutions like the central bank, or dictate that essential public services like health 
care are delivered by non-governmental organisations. Even where donors do not 
deliberately take sides, their presumed preferences can be constitutive of the ground-
rules over intra-elite struggles over power and influence the outcomes. For example in 
1993 Zambia’s President Chiluba used donor disquiet about corruption to force some 
leading political rivals out of his government. 
 
On the other hand, aid that crosses national borders takes shape in part from a 
catenation of forces within recipient countries – the aid-seekers’ perceived needs and 
expressed wants, their lobbying, and the influence of internal politicking on the aid 
negotiations. This means that influence over aid decisions, how much is provided and 
its stated purposes do not lie solely with the donors, not least because the donors are 
far from being a monolithic community: they are both manipulators and manipulated. 
India’s governments for instance have long had a reputation for formulating clear 
views of what they want and requiring that prospective donors respect those views. 
Yet the aid negotiation process and domestic perceptions of how effectively the 
country’s representatives bargained for a favourable deal can themselves have 
domestic political reverberations. This means the particular form that an agreed aid 
‘inflow’ takes might sometimes be described more revealingly as a ‘withinput’, even 
though the new resources underpinning the transfer come from abroad. Indeed this 
should only be expected if the fashionable ideas of ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’ in 
development co-operation and development solutions were truly put into practice - 
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even more so if the even more ambitious idea of local ‘authorship’ was applied as 
well. 
 
Clearly the extent to which the influence of politicians inside aid-receiving 
countries determines the nature of aid interventions from without cannot be 
speculated in advance. On the one side such influence appears to fall within the 
category of domestic ‘causes’ and their international effects - which appears to be the 
very opposite of the suggestion that more attention should be paid to the category of 
international ‘causes’ and their domestic effects. On the other side, the domestic 
impact of aid is itself influenced by the way aid transfers are mediated and then 
implemented inside the country. That can go a long way towards explaining why aid’s 
consequences often diverge from the effects intended or anticipated by the donors.6 
So, if notable actors like large landowners or politically-well connected companies are 
a crucial part of the story concerning aid’s impact once it has ‘entered the country’, 
then to exclude from analysis their possible influence at the stage of aid negotiation 
looks to be indefensible. Negotiations over international support for infrastructure 
developments that will serve natural resource extraction concessions operated by 
members of the ruling civilian or military elite are a classic example, in Indonesia for 
example. The influence that such actors will attempt to exert ex ante and then ex post 
may to some extent be substitutable: successful influence at one stage could obviate 
active involvement in the other; (predicted) failure at one stage spurs stronger 
engagement in the other.7 If, however, the distinction between domestic and 
international really does make the research more manageable – a pragmatic argument 
- then counter-claims that such a distinction fails to recognise the global 
interdependence of today’s world only reinforce the case for investigating the 
domestic political effects of all kinds of aid. 
  
Framing Research 
Analytical frameworks are heuristic devices, and an overly prescriptive approach can 
be counter-productive when studying such complex and contested subject matter as 
politics. The relative value of the alternatives will become fully apparent only after 
they have been tested in action. One possible approach – a simple classification for 
structuring inquiries into aid’s impact on domestic politics – would start by 
distinguishing between policies, institutions, and the political culture. The effects on 
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public policy might be the most immediately observable and easily measurable, but 
ultimately an impact on culture or institutions could be potentially more profound. 
The three variables are of course interdependent: policies might be impacted directly 
by aid and/or indirectly through aid’s effects on culture and institutions. In respect of 
policy it is important to distinguish between policy outputs and their outcomes: for 
example it is well known that structural adjustment lending has levered economic 
policy changes in many countries but produced some adverse economic as well as 
social and political effects. 
 
Among institutions, both formal and informal, the policy-making process has 
particular significance. The last fifteen years or so have seen deliberate attempts by 
donors to restructure institutions of governance, strengthening central financial 
management (central bank autonomy for example) and making proposals for 
decentralisation. But informal institutions like neo-patrimonialism and clientelism can 
prove highly resilient, and undermine the aforementioned efforts.  The way 
governments influence the distribution of wealth and the way the possession of money 
can influence such phenomena as party politics and electoral behaviour might change 
very little. One hypothesis is that aid inflows actually feed neo-patrimonial and 
clientelistic politics; another is that aid decline, which puts a ruling group’s control 
over scarce resources at a premium, actually tightens the grip of such informal 
politics. More detailed research on this would be helpful. And finally there is the 
question of aid’s potential impact on the political culture - norms, beliefs, sentiments, 
and expectations – ranging well beyond recent donor attempts at sponsoring ‘voter 
education’, to include such values as the sense of national identity, or, conversely, 
distinct group identities within society.  
 
A different and somewhat more elaborate framework for examining aid’s 
political impact would differentiate between such objects as the state, political society 
(including political parties), civil society, society more generally (social structure, 
norms and national identity) and economy. The analysis would then proceed beyond 
these categories per se down to the level of their individual components or members 
(e.g. individual government departments), to relations among members (e.g. inter-
departmental relations) or within categories (e.g. central-local relations) and across 
categories (e.g. governmental and non-governmental sectors). The precise line of 
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inquiry would vary from one unit or level of analysis to another. For instance in the 
case of the state, questions about aid’s impact on its size, structure, autonomy, 
capabilities, and sense of purpose – the very idea of the state  - would differ from 
questions about the stability, legitimacy and degree of democratic accountability that 
might be asked about the political regime. Aid’s consequences for the authority and 
policy performance of a government will not be the same as issues relating to civil 
society’s capacity to articulate political demands, relations between civil society and 
political parties (or with society more generally), and degree of social cohesion or 
national integration. 
 
In all of this there are significant gaps in knowledge. But the principle that 
productive research can be done in this general area is already well supported in the 
work of a minority of social scientists who have set about exposing specific strands, 
issues or themes to closer scrutiny.  They provide guidance to possible ways forward. 
Such studies include those of aid and governance (which is not necessarily the same 
as donor conceptions of ‘good governance’), of how aid might contribute more to 
developing the political capabilities of the poor, and the political significance of aid’s 
interaction with non-governmental organisations and civil society. Leading examples 
of the last include Hulme and Edwards [1997], Van Rooy [1998] and Biekart 
[1999]and Blair’s [2004] most recent work on a civil society advocacy scale and 
participation. On the first, Bräutigam’s work shows that aid can overburden public 
institutions and weaken state capacity. Together with Botchwey she draws attention to 
how aid and its restraints can inhibit governments from developing their own 
‘extractive capacity’, leading to budget fragmentation and revenue instability, as well 
as undermining domestic responsiveness and democratic decision-making [Bräutigam 
and Botchwey, 1999; see also Bräutigam, 2000]. And although researchers in the 
West have customarily enjoyed most access to publishing opportunities, the 
developing world continues to give voice to its own critical tradition on aid including 
in its political aspects, following the dependency analyses (1970s) and 1980s critiques 
of the ‘Washington consensus’ [see Hutchful, 1987]. Thus more recent studies include 
sharply informed accounts of how donor interventions reduce government to almost a 
bystander in the development process in its own country – Zambia [Saasa and 
Carlsson, 1996; Saasa with Carlsson, 2002]. 
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The donors’ professions of support for ‘capacity-building’ where states have 
been shown to be weak or ineffective – unable even to provide an adequate regulatory 
environment or the security of property rights that a functioning market economy 
requires – merits close investigation. On this, Morss’s [1984] early findings that the 
demands imposed by a proliferation of donors and their interventions bring about 
‘institutional destruction’ may be seen as a forerunner of Brautigam’s more 
contemporary work. That in turn has similarities with the thesis put forward by Moore 
and others (see IDS, 2002] that aid dependence prevents states developing 
accountability to their citizens. The logic of Moore and Putzel’s [1999] own 
recommendation that donors should engage more in political analysis, if they are to 
improve aid’s record in reducing poverty, actually bears out the reasoning in this 
article. They go on to offer an analytical framework identifying how aid might serve 
the cause of the poor in the context of differences in political institutionalisation and 
electoral competition. They restate the importance of an effective state and 
appropriate political parties, thereby departing from the fashionable view among some 
donors that poverty amelioration should be the responsibility of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). Indeed, a more participatory approach to formulating poverty 
reduction strategies, by involving in-country NGOs, is currently being promoted by 
the World Bank. The potential benefits of this for governments’ institutional capacity 
are being actively considered [see Overseas Development Institute, 2001]. Yet Moore 
and Putzels’s [1999:11] advice to both government agencies and NGOs is ‘focus more 
on creating incentives to collective action, above all by removing the obstacles they 
themselves create.’ (This advice carries specific policy implications for international 
aid.  These are pioneering analyses, but although sometimes the product of donor 
commissions, in this instance the World Bank’s 2000/01 World Development Report: 
Attacking poverty ultimately did not reflect the ideas for empowering the poor that 
Moore and Putzel included in their background paper [ODI, 2000: para. 3]. The moral 
could be that if the voice of scholars is to translate more obviously into influence, then 
even greater attention to dissecting aid’s domestic political impact – actual and 
potential – would hardly come amiss. 
 
It is clear from all of this that establishing aid’s effects and identifying how aid 
affects are not two separate exercises but are part and parcel of the same inquiry: to 
certify the first, we must try to make sense of the second. Moreover investigating 
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aid’s effects should also take in the political consequences of aid cut-offs and 
withdrawals, even where those anti-aid actions are not obviously politically-motivated 
but are responding to resource constraints on donors or doubts about aid’s 
developmental effectiveness. The political effects of aid increases and declines, offers 
and denials, may not be symmetrical. Also, although it is self-evident that establishing 
aid’s unintended consequences can be as valuable as measuring the intended effects, 
should analysis be restricted only to the direct or ‘first round’ effects? The answer is 
clearly no if it is outcomes that are viewed as being most significant; the political 
effects that follow indirectly from aid, including aid for economic or social objectives 
like poverty reduction such as through strengthening the non-governmental sector, 
could be weighty and enduring. So, just as a transfer of resources and any 
conditionalities that are attached might impact differently on different political 
constituencies, so the uses to which the additional resources are put can have notable 
political consequences – and these will not be summed up by measuring the initial 
allocations alone. This means there are a number of routes by which aid can exert 
political effects, of which the direct political impact of political aid is only the most 
obvious. The potential order of complexity is such that pragmatic considerations are 
bound to influence how many can be incorporated in any single study. But for 
analysts whose interests remain tightly focused on democracy and democratization, 
the possible permutations are easily summarised. For each combination of, on the one 
hand aid’s impact on democracy/democratization, and on the other hand its impact on 
other aspects of the polity, the overall impact could be: positive in both cases; 
negative in both cases; positive in one (either) case and negative in the other case; 
positive in one (either) case and neutral or nil in the other; negative in one (either) 
case and neutral or nil in the other; neutral or nil in both cases. The terms positive and 
negative here are of course value-laden, and disagreements over judgments such as 
these, and over what counts as strong or sufficient evidence are unavoidable. And 
while effects that reinforce or consolidate the political status quo could be as 
noteworthy as any that produce change it is also worth repeating that in some cases 
there may be no strong effects at all - the relevance of individual lines of inquiry will 
vary from country to country. 
 
 19
Four Big Hypotheses 
Researchers must define their own points of departure, which may at times be 
expressly connected with democratization, such as for instance the proposition that 
democracy aid is a more effective instrument than economic development assistance 
for achieving a sustainable transition to democracy. But so long as our understanding 
of aid’s political impact in the aggregate is more impressionistic and subject to large 
competing claims than a clearly defined consensus firmly grounded in systematic and 
exhaustive research, readers are entitled to see a specific research proposal. An 
examination of the long established literature together with the most recent 
contributions hints at least four big hypotheses that are worthy of investigation. They 
embody the combination of state, power and nation that constitute the defining 
political problematics of many – if by no means all - developing countries today. 
Their superficial simplicity could belie the actualité on the ground. Observers of the 
democracy effects of democracy aid are of course welcome to join the search for 
answers that would enable us to either confirm or refute the propositions below 
beyond all reasonable doubt:  
 
• Aid has less overall political impact in large countries with relatively strong states 
than in small countries with weak states.8 
• Aid impacts on the state most strongly in the economically weaker and financially 
most dependent countries. 
• Aid’s capacity to contribute to redistributing power by way of reducing poverty is 
modest, except possibly in the very long term. 
• Aid can be an effective tool for nation-building but only under certain identifiable 
conditions whose presence should not be assumed. 
 
Here is not the place to rehearse the respective merits of single-country 
longitudinal studies informed by speculation on the hypothetical counterfactual versus 
an appropriate choice of countries for comparative analysis. Suffice to say that testing 
and re-testing propositions like the ones above involve qualitative interpretations of 
evidence and judgmental reasoning at least as much as quantitative surveys of data. 
Insights by sources inside the country(ies) selected for study remain crucial in order to 
balance and correct the arguments of social scientists and country specialists who 
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observe aid’s impact from the outside. Here, Saasa’s work with Carlsson [1996; 2002] 
offers a good example. 
 
Conclusion 
The study of aid has moved on from a period when economists cared most (and they 
cared about the economics of aid) and political scientists were preoccupied with cold 
war concerns relating to the donors’ foreign policy, to today’s fascination with the 
effectiveness of democracy aid. That fascination takes its lead from the donors still, 
notwithstanding that the donors’ own agendas have evolved and are somewhat 
different from before. Traditionally economists tended to focus on one indicator of 
performance above all others - aid’s impact on economic growth. More recently, some 
economists and their allies have once again chosen to privilege a single but different 
notable performance indicator, namely aid’s impact on poverty. Although the political 
study of aid still marches across quite a broad front, reflecting the diverse orientations 
and expertise of the many analysts who study it, the rather specialised subject of 
democracy aid’s impact on democracy has recently garnered considerable emphasis, 
borne along initially by the development industry’s willingness to consider that 
political reform may be a (pre)requisite for socio-economic development and for 
development aid effectiveness. 
 
The quest for ever more scientifically accurate measurements of democracy 
aid’s performance, while valuable in itself and especially where the lessons can be 
applied to evaluating other kinds of aid, risks lending a spurious significance to 
findings that ignore the political consequences of other aid interventions. Indeed, the 
separation of an analytically distinct category of democracy aid is probably not 
helpful to the study of aid’s democratic implications, let alone its wider political 
consequences. A more joined-up approach to studying aid is more likely to enhance 
our knowledge and understanding than by cultivating a separate democracy aid niche. 
There are plenty of avenues for a combination of the legacy of literature from former 
decades and contemporary political developments to structure an orderly, short list of 
big hypotheses worthy of further investigation. In following them up the case for 
continuing to learn from other disciplines than political science that are currently 
exploring political aspects of aid is no less strong than in respect of studying 
democratization itself [see Burnell, 2003]. Contemporary research such as that into 
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governance, non-governmental organisations and the political mobilisation of the poor 
could be said to be already leading the way.  
  
Even a comprehensive audit of aid’s democracy achievements cannot be 
confined to just examples of democracy aid. Democracy aid is but a small fraction of 
all aid, and is only part of the aid that does have expressly political objectives. We 
could all take more interest in the domestic politics of aid in those major aid recipients 
where democracy aid is barely on the agenda – indeed, in places where 
democratization is not the principal fascination of the donors, or of the recipients or 
the political analysts who study these countries. That includes states that may be 
established democracies already, India for example. It also includes states where 
donors believe democratization is too risky (Pakistan, perhaps) or democracy-
promotion is too difficult and likely to be unproductive (for example China). It also 
includes countries where the main political issues are not captured by reference to 
democratization - where democratization is a distorting lens when used as a 
framework to study the country’s politics (Egypt, for example). The case will become 
irresistible if new theorising about development and the goals formally adopted for 
international development assistance change in step with the emergence of new 
perceived ‘threats’ to international security – for instance an increasing salience of 
state failure, or impending environmental catastrophe. Most important of all, 
assessing aid’s political impact rather than evaluating democracy aid’s effectiveness 
claims for political science an undertaking to explain the politics of countries not as 
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1. On the World Bank’s (1998) case that targeting would improve aid’s 
effectiveness relative to conditioned aid see Doornbos (2001) and Hout 
(2002). 
2. ‘Good governance’ for example is ‘evidently not to be equated with “politics”, 
let alone “political leadership”’. Doornbos (2001: 95).  
3. ‘It is surely preferable to look at specific forms of aid, in specific 
circumstances, to specific countries, in order to reach specific objectives. 
These are the only aid evaluations that make sense’. Pronk (2000: 620). 
4. Relevant themes are discussed by Pakenham (1973). Pakenham concluded that 
political development theories exercised little direct impact on official aid, 
unlike the influence of economic and cold war doctrines. He argued aid should 
aim at securing political development other than democracy, such as political 
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capacity, national integration, and participation, for the purpose of promoting 
goals like social justice, economic development and personal freedom. 
5. Aid probably has not yet exhausted its potential to contribute to violent 
internal conflict, but ways in which aid can help pull societies back from such 
conflict and/or prevent its recurrence are beginning to be addressed. See for 
example Addison (2003) and Collier et al. (2003), chapter 6. On aid’s less 
damaging but still dysfunctional effects on governance capabilities especially 
in Africa see Bräutigam and Botchwey (1999). 
6. On this a pioneering article was Cohen, Grindle and Walker (1985); see also 
Morrissey (1999).  
7. Putnam’s (1988) concept of a two-level game is helpful here. He argued that 
neither the game at the national level (domestic pressures pursing particular 
interests) nor the international level (governments pursuing scope to satisfy 
domestic pressures) can be ignored. His particular, however, was the domestic 
impact on negotiating positions in international trade, not the domestic impact 
of the trade negotiation outcomes.   
8. The proposition might seem intuitively obvious, but it does not sit easily with 
the familiar argument that the weaker the state the stronger will be its relative 
bargaining position internationally. A state enjoying little autonomy of 
domestic pressures is unable to make concessions in international negotiations 
that it feels unable to sell and deliver at home; conversely the stronger the 
state, the weaker its relative bargaining position internationally. Putnam 
(1988: 449). 
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